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Is it unjust that some people are less sexually desired than others? We might have sympathy 
for the sexually undesired but supposing they suffer an outright injustice can seem absurd. My 
view is that this reaction is too hasty, and that sexually desirability can be a matter of political 
justice. This is a strong claim, which is likely to invite a torrent of objections, whether for 
confusing misfortune with injustice, licensing unwarranted political meddling, indulging in 
sexual moralism, or asking the impossible of us. But I shall suggest a compelling social 
philosophy of sexual attraction can be articulated by considering the scope and character of 
sexual desires through the lens of structural injustice, while looking to collective and political 
rather than primarily individual and ethical remedies to the problem of unjust desire. 
 Sexual desirability is not a resource which can or should be doled out to the needy; nor 
is there a duty to desire, or a right to be so desired. Yet, sexual attractiveness matters in many 
of our lives – potentially influencing not only our opportunities for sexual intimacy, but our 
self-respect, social standing, and access to romantic relationships. Going sexually undesired or 
under-desired can compound disadvantage in these respects. Mere disadvantage, however, is 
not sufficient for political injustice. Instead, I shall argue there can be grounds of justice for 
holding people responsible for transforming the socio-structural processes which shape the 
distribution and character of sexual desires when these processes underpin domination and 
deprivation. 
I 
When, in 1854, John Stuart Mill suspected he was dying of tuberculosis, he took to his diary. 
His entry for March 26th tells us, “what any persons may freely do with respect to sexual 
relations should be deemed to be an unimportant and purely private matter, which concerns no 
one but themselves.”1 This may have been a particularly alluring proposition for Mill himself, 
who had courted scandal with an initially chaste but deeply intimate friendship with the married 
Harriet Taylor. His maxim is no more than a sketch, but it helpfully anticipates and condenses 
many contemporary liberal orthodoxies about sex – acting as an appealing corrective to prudish 
moralism and supposing that consensual sexual activity should not draw social opprobrium. 
But like many appealing maxims, it happens to be false. 
 Some recent philosophical discussions of sexual attraction begin to put pressure on 
Mill’s claim that freely undertaken sexual relations are unimportant, purely private, and of no 
concern to others. The most common counterexample has been racial preference in online 
dating. Armed with statistics from dating sites like OkCupid, philosophers have noted with 
regret that in some places black women and Asian men are systematically passed over by other 
daters.2 Dating preferences depend upon more than sexual attraction, of course, but if these 
preferences are sustained by sexual desires which reflect and reproduce disrespectful attitudes 
towards certain racial groups, then there are grounds for moral concern. Sonu Bedi goes further 
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still when he argues that if people are deprived of sexual intimacy on grounds of their race, 
then subject to certain provisos, this is more than “a private or moral wrong but an issue of 
social justice”.3 In support of this conclusion, he tries to show that the opportunity for sexual 
intimacy is a distinct primary good which almost all people pursue at some time in their lives, 
as well as being a contributor to the social bases of self-respect, and a central capability 
underpinning human dignity. 
Nor is racialised sexual aversion the only ground for concern. Robin Zheng argues that 
the fetishization of Asian women – known as ‘yellow fever’ – not only compounds racial 
othering, but can also lead its targets to experience a harmful depersonalisation.4 These women 
often struggle with the suspicion that they are not desired as individuals but merely as 
placeholders for some fantasy of submissive or exotic Asian femininity. Racialised fetishes are 
cases of sexual fixation rather than aversion, which raise concerns about the character and 
scope of sexual desire rather than its absence. Likewise, Russell Robinson has queried the racial 
dynamics of some gay communities, where “men of color face pressure to conform to certain 
racialized sex roles, such as the ‘aggressive black top’ and the ‘submissive Asian bottom.’”5 
We also find similar depersonalisation, objectification, and stereotyping to those 
identified by Zheng and Robinson independently of racial preferences, such as in the 
experiences of transgender and overweight people who are fetishised by ‘chasers’.6 So too, 
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Elizabeth Emens claims the infantalisation and wider desexualisation of those with disabilities 
often exposes them to what she calls “intimate discrimination”.7 Legal and cultural norms 
which reinforce the assumption that people with disabilities are primarily nonsexual – or 
alternatively, so hypersexual that they cannot responsibly exercise sexual autonomy – 
contribute to a social environment that excludes them from sexual relationships.8 
 These are all candidates for what I call ‘orectic injustice’: a form of injustice which 
arises from the distribution or character of people’s desires. I do not claim that every one of 
these cases is an injustice, but will defend the more general claim that there are some sexual 
orectic injustices which we can have responsibilities to address. I begin negatively by raising 
further objections to identifying unjust patterns of sexual desire. Then, I develop a positive 
account of orectic justice grounded in a model of structural injustice and political 
responsibility, which is equipped to answer these concerns. 
We can start with some folk wisdom from a song by the pop singer Selena Gomez. Her 
track “The Heart Wants What It Wants” echoes a line from one of Emily Dickinson’s letters in 
order to describe the dynamics of a troubled romantic relationship.9 In the chorus, Gomez sings, 
“There’s a million reasons why I should give you up / But the heart wants what it wants.” The 
song is premised on a platitude – namely, that we do not get to decide who we are sexually or 
romantically attracted to. We cannot simply opt in or out of erotic attraction, even if this 
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attraction is bad for ourselves or others. If this is true, then it might seem pointless to criticise 
or evaluate our sexual and romantic desires: they control us, and not the other way around. 
 If we cannot choose our desires, then it might seem like we have no ability to desire 
otherwise than we do, and therefore no duty of justice to do so. Of course, in this form, the 
objection is weak. While it is true that we do not simply choose our sexual desires, Mitchell 
and Wells appeal to an analogy with culinary desires to show how we can have some control 
over their formation.10 We cannot simply choose to like mushrooms in the way that we can 
simply select a mushroom dish from a menu. Yet, we can sometimes habituate our desires – 
learning to want different things through exposure to them, such as by developing new sexual 
desires by socialising with a broader range of people.  Likewise, Ann Cahill compares sexual 
desire to laughter, which can be experienced as involuntary in the moment, without this 
precluding the project of developing a less racist, sexist, or ableist sense of humour. On the 
basis of this analogy, Cahill suggests that sexual desires can also be reformed – recommending 
both self-reflection and an attempt to weaken ingrained habits through placing oneself in a new 
social environment as imperfect but worthwhile routes to achieving this.11 Of course, the 
plasticity of sexual desire can have its limits (think of the harmful and typically unsuccessful 
practice of gay and lesbian conversion therapy) but Mitchell, Wells, and Cahill all plausibly 
propose that sometimes we are able change some of the conditions under which our sexual 
desires are generated.12 
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 Yet, should we do so? Andera Long Chu expresses scepticism about the self-
disciplining of desire. She tells us: 
nothing good comes of forcing desire to conform to political principle. You could 
sooner give a cat a bath. […] Desire is, by nature, childlike and chary of government. 
The day we begin to qualify it by the righteousness of its political content is the day we 
begin to prescribe some desires and prohibit others. That way lies moralism only.13 
We find a number of concerns hinted at here: from the suspicion that consciously resisting and 
retraining our sexual desires will inevitably result in psychological harm, to the fear that 
assessing desires by political standards will lead to moralistic social policing. 
Let us also consider what controlling or habituating sexual desire would mean for the 
new objects of desire. There is a danger that the message is something like this: ordinarily, I 
would find you too repulsive, plain, or downright unsexy to bother with – but, out of a generous 
sense of duty, I have trained myself to overcome my aversion or indifference to you. At the 
very least, there seems something patronising about that attitude. As Amia Srinivasan puts it, 
“no one really wants a mercy fuck, and certainly not from a racist or a transphobe”.14 Given 
that it is characteristic of much modern sexuality for people to want to be desired for who they 
are as specific individuals, then attempts to rework desire on the grounds of impartial justice 
may be self-undermining, insofar as they produce something that falls short of what many 
people value about being sexually desired by others.15 
Srinivasan aptly sums up many of the challenges facing us: 
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The question, then, is how to dwell in the ambivalent place where we acknowledge that 
no one is obligated to desire anyone else, that no one has a right to be desired, but also 
that who is desired and who isn’t is a political question, a question usually answered by 
more general patterns of domination and exclusion.16 
Is it, then, possible to articulate a plausible philosophy of sexual desire that builds on this 
recognition of the political dimension of attraction? Can this be done in a way that also avoids 
the pitfalls identified of being psychologically harmful, moralistic, patronising, or self-
undermining?17 
II 
The category of structural injustice provides conceptual foundations for a compelling 
philosophy of sexual attraction. While ethicists such as Cahill have recognised that sexual 
desires are often “deeply implicated in structures of inequality”, my aim is provide a more 
systematic elaboration of this insight that can support a political analysis and response to the 
problem.18 To this end, I shall outline the most influential account of structural injustice, which 
can be found in the work of Iris Marion Young, and then show how it can help us understand 
orectic injustice with respect to our sexual lives. 
We can begin with Young’s general characterisation of structural injustices, which she 
says arise from “vulnerabilities to domination and deprivation that some people experience due 
to social-structural processes.” 19 Her understanding of social structures is indebted to William 
Sewell, who tells us they “are constituted by mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of 
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resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action.”20 
She adds that these structures also encompass the “practico-inert” effects of previous socially-
mediated human actions on the physical and cultural environment.21 More fully, Young takes 
social structures to be sets of cultural schemas, resources, and practico-inert environments 
which influence the constraints and opportunities of the occupants of different social 
positions.22 For instance, class, race, and gender act as positions within social structures in this 
way – widening some affordances while narrowing others. Thus, Young likens the effect of a 
social structure to a “channel” which guides and constrains the flow of people’s actions.23 
Structural injustice emerges when socio-structural processes “put large groups of 
persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities,” while enabling others to dominate or develop and exercise their own 
capacities.24 What, then, are domination and capacity-deprivation? Domination consists in 
“institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their 
actions or the conditions of their actions”.25 In other words, the dominated have little control 
over the social and political forces that shape their lives. Young adverts to Marilyn Frye’s 
famous birdcage analogy for oppression to explain what she means by “social structures that 
inhibit the capacities of some people”, whereby our opportunities to act can be delimited by 
the cumulative effects of multiple obstacles – each like individual wires that may be 
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I read “institutional conditions” weakly here – taking them to refer to social structures in general. 
circumventable when taken alone but which together make a cage that prevents free action.26 
In sum, for Young, structural injustice occurs when a set of cultural schemas, resources, and 
practico-inert environments render the occupants of a social position vulnerable to domination 
or capacity-deprivation while enabling others to dominate or command a wide range of 
opportunities. If sheer vulnerability to domination or capacity-deprivation in these ways is 
sufficient, then structural injustice becomes very widespread. While there are good reasons to 
care if non-domination and non-deprivation occurs on an insecure basis, for our purposes we 
can make do with a more conservative version of the formulation that holds that actual 
domination or capacity-deprivation are needed. 
We began our inquiry into orectic injustice with the observation that online daters in 
some countries routinely avoid black women and Asian men, such that occupying these social 
positions will, other things being equal, make it more difficult to find a sexual partner. 
Furthermore, these findings suggest the possibility of a wider pattern of racialised sexual 
aversion, with troubling implications for the welfare and social standing of disdained groups. 
For instance, sociologists confirm that sexual attractiveness is an increasingly central factor in 
determining access to romantic relationships, and that such relationships are correlated with 
high levels of subjective wellbeing.27 But even beyond opportunities for sexual intimacy and 
romantic relationships, feelings of stigmatisation arising from being the object of racialised 
sexual aversion can undermine people’s self-respect. 
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Do such effects amount to domination or unequal capacity-distribution? Domination, 
so understood, obtains when people are prevented from participating in shaping the social 
conditions under which they act, such as the political authority to which they are subject and 
the informal rules that regulate social interactions with them. Systemic sexual aversions 
grounded in racialised preferences are often plausible candidates for such domination, 
especially when they disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities. For instance, Asian 
men often encounter cultural schemas which lead them to be read as effeminate and passive, 
which, when combined with heterosexual norms favouring a confident and active masculinity, 
results in diminished sexual desire for them on average.28 When these schemas and norms are 
imposed or sustained by members of majority groups, with little scope for the disadvantaged 
to shape, contest, or resignify how they are understood by others, then there is a danger of 
cultural domination. 
Socio-structural processes driving racialised sexual aversion can also underpin 
capacity-deprivation. Consider the impact of relatively low levels of sexual desire for black 
women in certain contexts when compared to women of other racial groups. Some of the direct 
effects on the capacities of these women are obvious – namely, that ceteris paribus they will 
have less opportunities for sexual pleasure, intimacy, and romantic connection than others. But 
other effects are subtler and more closely aligned with the birdcage model of oppression, such 
as the relative loss of opportunities to form long-term relationships, which can bring economic 
costs associated with single-earner households, and so compound the economic 
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marginalisation that black women disproportionately encounter from other sources.29 Indeed, 
even upwardly-mobile and college-educated black women in the U.S. face unequal and limited 
sexual and romantic options, owing to a confluence of “class-race-gender constraints”, 
including attempts to consciously avoid negatively stereotyped behaviours commonly 
associated with poorer black women’s sexuality.30 
Domination and capacity-deprivation are not confined to racialised sexual aversion. 
The racial fetishism of yellow fever presents us with another example of a harmful hermeneutic 
schema which significantly shapes social interactions with Asian women but which largely 
escapes their control. Likewise, people with disabilities often rightly resent cultural 
conventions and legal apparatuses that reinforce their desexualisation, under conditions where 
they are denied sufficient social agency to fundamentally reframe how others see and treat 
them, and to thereby avoid some measure of domination.31 Yellow fever and the 
desexualisation of the disabled can also involve capacity-deprivation too. Consider the negative 
effects on self-esteem reported by those subjected to each of these phenomena, which can 
create obstacles to autonomous action that further constrict their effective room for manoeuvre 
beyond the already excessively narrow social roles often impressed upon them.32 
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III 
Social structures which shape sexual preferences in ways that result in domination and 
capacity-deprivation can be of ethical concern. The awareness that we are reproducing 
preferences or social structures which disempower or harm others could prompt us to recognise 
a moral obligation to examine, evaluate, and alter our individual sexual comportment or social 
behaviour. For instance, someone strongly inclined to exclusively seek out Asian women as 
sexual partners, or even who reproduces stereotypical attitudes towards Asian women which 
treat them as particularly exotic or submissive, would be a plausible candidate for the bearer 
of a moral responsibility to change their ways. 
We can consider and assess two ethical strategies which have been suggested for 
reshaping our sexual desires on an individual basis in this way. The first of these is Elizabeth 
Emens’ appeal to ethical self-reflection. She suggests that people should engage in a kind of 
structured self-inquiry, where we ask, “What are the essential functions of the job of being my 
partner?”33 We then scrutinize our own replies to this question so that we can better understand 
why we tend to exclude some people from our pool of potential partners based on factors like 
race or disability. Emens says she hopes this will serve a “debiasing function by helping to 
contextualize these traits and to encourage more than a gut response based on the norms of 
intimate discrimination”. 34 The final stage of self-reflection is to ask whether there are 
accommodations we or others could make that would help someone we would otherwise 
exclude to instead fulfill our essential criteria. This line of thought is modelled on the 
requirement that much disability legislation imposes on employers to consider whether 
reasonable accommodations could be made for potential employees. 
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 The second strategy focuses not on individual self-reflection but individual 
rehabituation.35 Recall that Mitchell and Wells construct an analogy between preferences for 
food and sexual desires in order to point out that individuals can influence our desires over 
time by choosing to put themselves in environments which are likely to cultivate new 
attractions. Like persisting in eating familiar foods, which can begin to form new culinary 
desires, they reason that socializing with members of unfamiliar groups can make us more open 
to developing sexual and romantic desires for them. Mitchell and Wells consider the objection 
that forms of habituation like gay conversion therapy are ineffective and have disastrous 
results, but they suggest that both lived experience and empirical research on desire-formation 
with respect to race shows that success here is much more likely.36 
  There is, however, reason to be cautious here. While both self-reflection and 
rehabituation can have some effect on desire-formation, exhorting individuals to modify their 
own desires may be of limited effect. These individuals first need to be convinced there is a 
problem with their desires, with many likely to respond defensively to any suggestion there is 
a racial or ableist dimension to their own preferences. Furthermore, supposing people can be 
convinced, techniques like self-reflection and rehabituation may take us only so far in actually 
modifying our sexual desires, since they go against the grain of the social and psychological 
forces which helped produce the original desires, which will often remain intact – even if, like 
Mitchell, Wells, and Cahill recommend, we find some opportunities for placing ourselves in 
new social contexts. 
 Other solutions depend less on the good will and initiative of individuals diligently 
working to remold their own sexual desires but rather deeper structural interventions in the 
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social and physical environments within which our desires are formed. Some of these solutions 
are directed towards the infrastructure of dating – for instance, Sonu Bedi has suggested 
measures like removing racial search functions of dating apps.37 There might, however, be 
some legitimate uses of these functions, such as the desire of members of racial minorities to 
find a partner from a group who is less likely to subject them to racial microaggressions or 
fetishization. Thus, Robinson has claimed, “a person of color who has experienced persistent 
racial conflict in romantic relationships might legitimately adopt a preference for people of his 
or her own race”.38 In a similar vein, Ian Ayers and Jennifer Gerarda Brown suggest there are 
grounds to adopt an “antisubordination norm” in evaluating sexual preferences, which allows 
that there is “stronger moral justification for a black homoracial orientation than a white 
homoracial one”.39 Therefore, a blanket ban on racial searching in online dating may be too 
hasty.  
Nevertheless, there is good reason to consider other aspects of the architecture of online 
dating, such as the assumptions underlying the design of matching algorithms. For instance, 
the dating app CoffeeMeetsBagel was found to show users a disproportionate number of 
potential partners of their own ethnicity, even if those users had explicitly stated that they had 
no ethnic preference. The company defended itself by arguing that the revealed preference of 
its users – whatever their stated preference – showed they did favour homogamous matches.40 
However, we do not have to take a predicted revealed preference as the ultimate standard in 
design decisions. In this spirit, and noting the fluidity of our intimate desires in response to 
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unanticipated options, Hutson et al have argued that rather than “relying on assumptions about 
subconscious preferences, [...] intimate platforms should instead encourage accidents and 
exploration with the goal of actively counteracting bias”.41  
We might worry that such design choices would deprive users of autonomy. However, 
there is no neutral matching mechanism free from assumptions about which other users a 
person should encounter most prominently. Even a totally random presentation of potential 
daters favours an open-minded comportment – indeed, one that will be frustratingly 
undiscriminating for most users, who will want to narrow down their options to a manageable 
but viable selection. Therefore, so long as users are not being deceived about the matching 
process, there is legitimate scope to select a default algorithm that promotes rather than 
frustrates social justice. 
Further structural solutions target the legal background to desire formation. Emens 
proposes lifting formal civil or criminal restrictions on who can have sex or marry, such as 
excessively strict competency requirements imposed on consent to sex for people with 
intellectual disabilities.42 She also thinks we should design institutions and urban spaces with 
an eye to “propinquity” – that is, who does and does not meet on a regular basis.43 When 
propinquity considerations are designed into physical and social environments, then this shifts 
the burden of seeking out atypical interactions away from the individual (as in individual-led 
reflection and rehabituation), while still leaving some scope to them with respect to the nature 
and intensity of their social interactions with others.  
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These structural interventions focus on the background structures within which people 
form desires. This avoids the problem of individuals having to consciously reshape their own 
desires in ways that might be experienced as patronising or depersonalising by the objects of 
those desires. While it is possible that beneficiaries of structural interventions will still feel 
condescended to, such feelings are likely to be less intense than interpersonal angst about 
whether a particular sexual or romantic partner is motivated primarily by a sense of justice 
rather than immediate attraction. Furthermore, structural interventions do not involve a 
requirement to undertake a deeply personal project of self-transformation, with a potentially 
psychologically demanding attempt to break oneself out of longstanding patterns of sexual 
desire. Instead, this work is partially outsourced to the practico-inert environments we find 
ourselves in.  
The principally structural response recommended here goes beyond the recognition of 
structural determinants of sexual desire that we find in theorists like Cahill.44 It also matters 
how we respond to this insight. Cahill’s focus is an ethical strategy of resisting or mitigating 
the effects of pernicious social structures through self-reflection and individual rehabituation, 
rather than a political strategy of transforming these structures. As we shall see shortly, this 
political framework can also give us a sense of who has the strongest political responsibilities 
to undertake this collective work of transformation. However, it is worth emphasising that we 
are not always faced with a sharp choice between individual and structural remedies: benign 
forms of individual rehabituation or self-reflection – such as efforts to unpick one’s own racial 
or ableist stereotyping through self-education – can be combined with wider socio-structural 
 
44 Cahill, ‘Sexual Desire, Inequality, and the Possibility of Transformation’, p. 284. 
change. The resulting approach is likely to be more effective than either strategy pursued 
alone.45 
IV 
What can justify moving beyond individual ethical self-reform to mandate these broader 
structural interventions that reorder the physical, legal, and social environment within which 
sexual desires are formed? Young’s account of structural injustice provides us with the 
resources for identifying explicitly political responsibilities to rectify such injustice irrespective 
of any ethical duties it generates. This political rather than primarily ethical conception of 
structural injustice can provide the initial impetus for a more ambitious project of structural 
transformation of sexual desire – although, as we shall see, important questions as to the limits 
of political action in matters of sexuality still need to be addressed.  
No single individual is the sole cause of the structural conditions under which they or 
others find themselves, and isolated individuals only rarely have the power to radically reshape 
these structures. So, on what basis can we identify whether someone has a political 
responsibility to enact changes to the background structures which shape sexual desire? The 
state might seem to be most appropriate bearer of responsibility, and able to make some 
headway here – for instance, spearheading attempts to reform legislation that compounds 
orectic injustice. But many of the social structures that determine who and how we desire are 
more informal and cultural than those mandated in explicit legislation and policy.  
Young’s model can offer a solution here, insofar as it provides us with conceptual 
resources for assigning a wider political responsibility to correct structural injustice. In 
 
45 I do not mean to exclude the possibility that there may be other ways of avoiding orectic structural injustice 
than influencing our own or other people’s desires – such as bolstering their capacities, social power, or social 
standing in other respects. However, this is not a strategy I shall investigate here. 
particular, Young identifies four parameters for thinking through the distribution of political 
responsibilities: power, privilege, interest, and collective ability.46 The greater the power of an 
agent over the relevant structures, the more their relative privilege, the closer aligned their 
interests are with bringing about justice, and the deeper their ability to bring about change 
collectively with other individuals and groups, then the more political responsibility they are 
attributed. Conversely, those lacking power and privilege are accorded less responsibility for 
combatting structural injustice. 
 Consider how these parameters would shape attributions of responsibility in the context 
of structural injustice arising from the desexualisation of the disabled. Those with greater 
powers over the relevant cultural norms, environmental factors, and legal barriers to 
opportunities for sexual intimacy for people with disabilities should recognise a greater 
political responsibility: the screenwriter who has the opportunity to sensitively depict the 
sexual lives of people with disabilities, the urban planner able to address propinquity by making 
provision for accessible workplaces and public amenities, the legislator debating mental health 
and mental capacity bills, and so on.47 Those with more collective leverage will have a larger 
responsibility too, such as those plugged into disability rights groups, political parties, and 
other organisations within civil society, or who have the capacity to organise large-scale 
political and social action to address or educate people about the problem of desexualisation, 
including pressuring government, media, healthcare providers, social services, and workplaces 
into action. Likewise, people with a greater interest in ending desexualisation are more 
appropriate bearers of the political responsibility for combatting it, such that movements in this 
 
46 Young, Responsibility for Justice, p. 144-7. 
47 Similar considerations will apply with respect to race, such as to the author who can avoid gratuitous Orientalism 
in their depiction of Asian women, the local government official who can push against racial ghettoisation in their 
zoning decisions, or the computer programmer able to redesign dating platforms without a bias towards 
homogamy. 
area are led by disabled people themselves who are at the sharp end of a society whose members 
are unable to comprehend how they could make a desirable sexual partner. So too, the relative 
level of privilege of the agents involved has a bearing, with the richer, educated, healthier, and 
less oppressed being expected to absorb more of the costs of pushing for desexualisation than, 
say, those people with disabilities who have to bear heavy burdens elsewhere in their lives due 
to poverty or discrimination. 
Young’s move from individual moral responsibility to political responsibility also helps 
to shift the focus from individual blame, which might end up being moralising and shaming, 
and towards a collective and cooperative response to the problem of orectic injustice. 
Furthermore, it does not rely on us making potentially invidious, irrelevant, or unproductive 
ethical assessments of the beliefs or character of the agents in question. For example, Raja 
Halwani’s qualified defence of racial sexual preferences tries to establish that the possessors 
of such preferences need not be racist, in the sense of holding racist beliefs or attitudes.48 From 
the perspective of structural injustice, this kind of inquiry is beside the point. We do not care 
so much what goes on in people’s heads for its own sake, but rather what contribution their 
sexual preferences and associated behaviour makes to systemically reproducing inequality and 
its effects on the social world of others. This shift in perspective is similar to the one pursued 
by Kate Manne in her recent analysis of misogyny, which proposes that we pay less attention 
to whether an individual has a feeling of hatred towards women deep in their hearts, but rather 
concern ourselves with whether women confront hostile social systems and environments 
which enforce patriarchal relationships.49 
 
48 Halwani, ‘Racial Sexual Desires’. 
49 Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
 The politicisation of orectic injustice might seem troubling, however, when compared 
to more modest ethical projects of individual self-scrutiny and rehabituation of sexual desire. 
Political intervention in the regulation of sexual relationships has a grim history: eugenics, 
forced sterilization, anti-miscegenation laws, punishment of fornication, criminalization of 
homosexuality, and many more disconcerting cases of state intrusion into people’s sexual lives. 
An understandable reaction to this history would be to adopt a ‘sexual liberalism of fear’: the 
guarantee or strong presumption by the state of non-intervention with respect to the non-
coerced sexual desires and choices of its citizens, informed by a well-evidenced historical 
pessimism about the meagre benefits and outsized harms that interventionist political policies 
in this area have had.50 When stacked against this bleak history, then recommendations for 
ethically-motivated attempts to rework one’s own sexual desires appear more attractive, insofar 
as the locus of control remains with the desiring individual rather than a potentially 
overreaching political collective. 
 Yet, there are reasons to be less sceptical of a political framing. Firstly, a political 
diagnosis and remedy to orectic injustice need not rely on the clunking fist of the state to force 
people to change their ways. We have seen that the conception of political responsibility 
driving Young’s understanding of structural injustice is not statist: all individuals and groups 
with the relevant power, privilege, interest, or collective ability are responsible for acting 
cooperatively to redress the injustice. Nor is state action typically the most appropriate vehicle 
for achieving orectic justice – for instance, individuals, civil society groups, and non-state 
institutions took centre-stage when we considered desexualisation and disability. Politics is 
 
50 See Judith N. Shklar, ‘The Liberalism of Fear’, Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 21-38 and Srinivasan, ‘Does Anyone Have the Right to Sex?’  
about far more than the state and its coercive power: it extends to many forms of collective 
determination of the conditions under which we live together. 
Are there, nevertheless, any principled limits on state action in pursuing orectic justice? 
Respect for personal autonomy, including sexual autonomy, should preclude states from 
punishing those with racial or ableist sexual aversions or fetishes, or singling them out for 
mandatory education. Other direct forms of coercion, such as forced socialisation or 
involuntary pharmacological interventions to reshape sexual desire ought to be ruled out on 
similar grounds. Likewise, a presumption in favour of worker control over private economic 
enterprises would provide a reason for the state to simply recommend rather than mandate 
certain infrastructures on dating sites and apps. Instead, the state should concentrate on 
transforming more diffuse socio-structural influences on desire-formation – such as in urban 
design, general anti-discrimination legislation, sexual education in school curricula, disability 
law reform, and closing racial wealth gaps. 
 The state is not the only political force that might be overzealous in opposing orectic 
injustice. Consider Mill’s wariness towards “the tendency of society to impose, by other means 
than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them”.51 For instance, does a political responsibility to remedy orectic injustice recommend a 
collective social shaming or shunning of people for their sexual aversions or fixations? No. The 
structural focus of my account of orectic injustice is intended to refocus our attention away 
from questions of people’s individual moral liability and towards the environmental pressures 
that contributed to the formation of their sexual preferences. Of course, individual moral 
evaluation of oneself and others with respect to orectic injustice is still permissible and will 
often prompt some degree of effective self-reflection and rehabituation. But pushing beyond 
 
51 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 8. 
this to encourage a culture of moralistic denunciation is not an attractive way of discharging a 
political responsibility to combat unjust patterns of sexual attraction, especially once we have 
acknowledged that people’s individual agency with respect to desire is often conditioned by 
social structures over which they have limited influence. 
 Our account faces a final objection that arises not from the fear that remedies to 
structural orectic injustice are overreaching but that such injustice is nevertheless 
overdiagnosed. Consider people who are undesired merely because they are regarded as ugly 
or otherwise aesthetically unappealing. Does it really matter from the standpoint of justice that 
beautiful Alcibiades quickens more hearts than snub-nosed Socrates? We might recognise 
general ethical and political duties not to needlessly socially exclude and stigmatise those found 
less aesthetically appealing in our everyday lives.52 Similarly, we may try to take a less caustic 
or inflexible attitude towards such people in cultivating our own sexual desires. But accounts 
which imply that the merely aesthetically disfavoured are victims of outright political injustice 
in their sexual lives are likely to strike many of us as excessively lax – either trivialising 
injustice or else producing too many false positives.53 I shall recommend a relational egalitarian 
response to this challenge. 
 
52 On aesthetic discrimination in general, see Duane Willard, ‘Aesthetic Discrimination Against Persons’, 
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 16 (1977), pp. 676-92; Alan Soble, ‘Physical Attractiveness and Unfair 
Discrimination’, International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1982), pp. 37-64; Francesca Minerva, ‘The 
Invisible Discrimination Before Our Eyes: A Bioethical Analysis’, Bioethics 31:3 (2017), pp. 180-9. 
53 For discussion of related objections in this vein, see Bedi, ‘Sexual Racism’, pp. 1003-5; Zheng, ‘Why Yellow 
Fever Isn’t Flattering’, pp. 412-4; Raja Halwani, ‘Racial Sexual Desires’, The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary 
Readings, ed. Raja Halwani, Alan Soble, Sarah Hoffman, and Jacob Held (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2017), pp. 181-99; Carina Fourie, ‘Wrongful Private Discrimination and the Egalitarian Ethos’, The Routledge 
Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, ed. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 421-
32, p. 428. 
Political injustice is not simply any social disadvantage or unfairness. Elizabeth 
Anderson famously argues “the proper aim of egalitarian justice” is to “end oppression” and 
“create a community in which people stand in relations of equality to others” rather than to 
“ensure that everyone gets what they morally deserve”.54 Seen from this relational egalitarian 
perspective, we should identify structural injustice only when social structures bring about 
domination or capacity-deprivation that constitutes or compounds oppression or fundamentally 
unequal social status. 
 Sexual aversion or fetishism encountered by racially marginalised groups often arises 
from or coexists with racialised othering, stereotyping, discrimination, segregation, 
microaggression, economic exclusion, cultural denigration, or even outright violence. 
Likewise, desexualisation of the disabled is both fuelled by and reproduces widespread 
ableism. When this happens, there are typically strong grounds for supposing that domination 
or capacity-deprivation resulting from such aversions, fetishes, and desexualisation will 
reinforce oppressive social relationships, with sexual attitudes towards racial minorities and 
people with disabilities bolstering their effective status as second-class citizens.  
Yet, orectic structural injustice need not always be a dimension of a wider social 
injustice. If socio-structurally-mediated sexual aversion to the aesthetically unappealing was 
so pronounced and burdensome that the domination or capacity-deprivation they faced as a 
result made it unreasonably challenging for them to live with comparable dignity to others in 
society, then this would be a pure orectic structural injustice. More plausibly, this injustice 
would obtain when our cultural schemas or practico-inert environments are responsible for 
obesity, ugliness, plainness, scarring, or disfigurement being the object of such intense sexual 
 
54 Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, pp. 288-9. 
 
aversion that its targets were left without capacities for sexual intimacy or self-respect that 
would allow them to live as people of equal social status to others, despite not being oppressed 
or socially disadvantaged in other respects. Under these conditions, there would be a political 
responsibility on those with the greatest power, privilege, interest, and joint ability to 
collectively reimagine and reshape social structures in order to foster more egalitarian social 
relationships with the aesthetically unappealing. That could include changes to shaming 
linguistic habits, derogatory interpersonal norms, modes of media representation, artistic 
conventions, or dating infrastructure. But it would not require us to be totally indifferent to 
how people look in our individual sexual preferences.  
 
VI 
My aim has been to demonstrate that there are injustices in the distribution and character of our 
sexual desires and that we can be held responsible for correcting these injustices. Among the 
central examples of orectic injustice canvassed have been those of racialised sexual desire: 
whether the racial aversion confronted by many black women and Asian men, the 
depersonalising fetishism of yellow fever encountered by Asian women, or the racialised sex 
roles often foisted upon black men. But we have considered cases such as the desexualisation 
of the disabled too, which also involve subjection to dominating power and social systems 
which result in highly unequal distributions of capacities. In developing an analysis of these 
phenomena, I have built upon the general conception of structural injustice found in Iris Marion 
Young’s writings – showing how it can used to diagnose those socio-structural processes 
shaping the formation of desire which can compound systemic domination and capacity-
deprivation, as well as supporting attributions of political responsibility to alter these structures. 
We saw that when orectic structural injustices arise, this does not license a moralistic 
condemnation of individual wrongdoing, which is intended to shame or compel wrongdoers 
into changing their ways. The structural account of orectic injustice pursued here instead directs 
us to ways we can intervene in wider social structures rather than singling out specific 
offenders. These structural solutions include making changes to the architecture of online 
dating, removing unnecessary legal obstacles to sexual intimacy, and ensuring that institutional 
and urban design pays sufficient attention to social mixing. Structural interventions do not 
preclude individual ethical projects of self-transformation and rehabituation of desire, but they 
avoid the potentially psychologically burdensome and self-undermining aspects of these 
approaches – partially outsourcing the work of preference-reformation to the practico-inert 
environments we find ourselves in. 
The account also provides a plausible model for assigning political responsibilities for 
implementing these structural changes, which will fall heavier on those with greater power and 
privilege. In doing so, it emphasises the importance of non-statist political interventions, while 
prohibiting remedies to orectic injustice that rely on highly coercive and punitive state action 
or collective social shaming or shunning. Finally, we have seen how a relational egalitarian 
approach to orectic justice can provide a measured response to the aesthetically unappealing, 
which allows that they are subject to orectic structural injustice only when exposed to 
oppression or second-class citizenship. Thus, in conclusion, there are compelling reasons to 
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